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Abstract
Epistemic egoists are individuals who believe that there are no prima facie reasons why we should accept
testimony. In this paper I examine the question “is epistemic egoism an intellectual virtue?” I assert that a
variant of epistemic egoism, called weak epistemic egoism, satisfies reliabilist conditions for intellectual
virtue. I also assert that extreme epistemic egoism, characterized as a blanket rejection of all testimony, is
an intellectual vice. I also examine the possibility that extreme epistemic egoism is an intellectual virtue in
rare situations. I argue that extreme epistemic egoism can be valuable, but not for strictly epistemic reasons.
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In this paper I present arguments for both
virtuous epistemic egoism and vicious
epistemic egoism. The main claim that
governs the two arguments is that
epistemic egoism can be considered a
virtue and, conversely, may also be seen as
a vice depending on its extent. By “extent”
I mean the level of engagement the
epistemic egoist has with testimony: weak
epistemic egoism is less “extensive” in this
sense than extreme epistemic egoism. I will
argue that weak epistemic egoism can be
seen as a virtue while extreme epistemic
egoism may be considered a vice. For this
task I will use reliabilist criteria for
epistemic virtue.
The first part discusses the main features of
epistemic egoism and its variants. The
second part explains the reliabilist criteria
used in evaluating for virtue and vice. The
third part presents the argument for weak
epistemic egoism as an intellectual virtue.
The fourth part presents the argument for
extreme epistemic egoism as an intellectual
vice.

1. Epistemic Egoism

epistemic egoist trusts himself in seeking
truth and knowledge‚ but is more cautious
in trusting others.
1.1 Fundamental and Derivative Authority
The level of trust an agent has for testimony
can be gauged by what sort of authority he
accords to other believers. Foley (1994, 55)
uses the distinction between fundamental
authority and derivative authority to
distinguish epistemic egoism from
epistemic
universalism.
We
grant
fundamental authority to testimony when
we allow ourselves to be “influenced by
others even when we have no special
information indicating that they are
reliable” (Foley 1994, 55). In contrast‚ we
grant derivative authority when we accept
testimony only if we have information that
the source is credible. Foley describes
derivative authority as “authority granted
from my reasons for thinking that your
information‚ abilities‚ or circumstances put
you in an especially good position to
evaluate the claim” (1994, 55).
Epistemic egoists never grant fundamental
authority to others‚ but they can grant
derivative authority (Foley 1994, 55-56). An
epistemic egoist can grant derivative
authority to a source if he thinks the source
is an expert on the issue‚ for instance. In
short‚ epistemic egoists often trust only
themselves‚ but in some cases they can
have good reasons to trust others.

Foley (1994, 55) describes the epistemic
egoist’s position as: “in and of itself‚ the fact
that someone else believes a claim gives me
no reason whatsoever to believe it.” In
other words‚ the epistemic egoist believes
that there are no prima facie reasons why
we should accept testimony. This is in
contrast to the epistemic universalist‚ who Foley (2004, 86) labels individuals who
“always treats the fact that another person never
grant
authority‚
whether
believes p as reason to believe p” fundamental or derivative‚ to the opinions
(Zagzebski 2009, 88). We can say that the
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of others as epistemic egotists. Epistemic It may seem obvious that WEE is virtuous
egotists simply do not accept any kind of and EEE is vicious. After all, what
testimony.
reasonable person will never accept any
kind of testimony? I believe however that
1.2 Weak and Extreme Epistemic Egoism
although these assumptions may seem
Linda Zagzebski distinguishes between a obvious, spelling out their theoretical basis
weak epistemic egoist (WEE) and an is not trivial. At the very least, we can see
extreme epistemic egoist (EEE). The WEE how a common attitude towards belief and
thinks that someone else believing p counts believers—epistemic
egoism—can
be
as a reason for her to believe p if she knows assessed through the lens of virtue
that the other person is credible or reliable. epistemology.
The WEE “will accept certain beliefs on
Reliabilist
Criteria
for
testimony‚ but only when she has evidence 2.
that the testifier is trustworthy” (Zagzebski Intellectual Vice
2009, 88). In contrast‚ an EEE does not think I will use reliabilist criteria to determine if
that someone else believing p can be a EE is a virtue or a vice. Reliabilism focuses
reason for her to believe p even if she has on the ability of an epistemic process or
evidence that the testifier is reliable. In character trait to produce good epistemic
short‚ an EEE “will never believe on effects such as true belief, knowledge, and
testimony” (Zagzebski 2009, 88). Foley’s understanding. In this sense, we can claim
egoist and egotist are parallel to that a character trait is an intellectual vice if
Zagzebski’s WEE and EEE‚ respectively.
and only if:
The weak epistemic egoist requires
adequate justification in order for trust to
be accorded to others. For the epistemic
egoist, trust is earned, not given. The weak
egoist requires evidence “upfront” and
there is no such thing as testimony taken
“in good faith.” In the analysis of the
potential virtue of this attitude or character
trait, it must be pointed out how it can
effectively lead an individual to the
attainment of truth. On the other hand, an
extreme epistemic egoist assumes that
witnesses are either acting on “bad faith” or
there simply is no reason to trust them.

IV1: it produces bad epistemic
effects.
IV2: it fails to produce good
epistemic effects.
A character trait is an intellectual vice‚
following reliabilism‚ if it satisfies either
IV1 or IV2. A character trait needs to satisfy
only one of the two to be considered an
intellectual vice.
IV1 means that a character trait or
epistemic process makes it more likely‚ all
other things being equal‚ that I would
arrive at false belief, ignorance, or
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confusion. This may happen because the
character trait leads me to weaker evidence
or causes me to not encounter useful
evidence. It could also be that I encounter
strong evidence‚ but due to this character
trait or process I fail to see the value of the
evidence. IV2 is a variant of IV1‚ but it is
more concerned with the lack of good
epistemic effects produced instead of the
presence of bad epistemic effects.

3. Weak Epistemic Egoism as an
Intellectual Virtue
In this section I argue that weak epistemic
egoism is an intellectual virtue due to its
non-satisfaction of IV1 and IV2. I aim to
show here that weak epistemic egoism is
conducive to the attainment of good
epistemic effects.
Weak epistemic egoism is consistent with
reasonable epistemic doubt, which can
increase the reliability of our attempts at
arriving at truth. I define epistemic doubt
as a kind of doubt which emphasizes the
following: (A) to not believe a claim unless
there is adequate evidence for it; and (B) to
not believe a claim unless there is sufficient
reason to believe it. Conditions A and B are
not mutually exclusive of one another. B
can be seen as the more general principle
from which A is derived. Weak epistemic
egoism is more in line with B, because the
requirement for reliable sources is a
particular application of this sufficiency
principle.

Weak epistemic egoism, like epistemic
doubt, can serve as a defense against
vicious gullibility. I assert that gullibility is
a vice because it connotes the uncritical
acceptance of the views of others. This
character trait reduces the possibility that
its bearer will attain true belief (much less
knowledge)
because
it
produces
incoherence in the person’s belief.
It is worthwhile to note here that gullibility
can be linked to epistemic universalism.
Immediate and uncritical acceptance of
others’ views is found in both gullibility
and epistemic universalism. This is also the
reason why epistemic universalism, at least
in this paper, is not considered an epistemic
virtue. Being an epistemic universalist,
much like being gullible, can produce an
incoherent system of beliefs, particularly if
the views one accepts, willy-nilly, are
contradictory or inconsistent. Weak
epistemic egoism prevents this situation by
promoting a more stringent standard for
accepting the views of others.
Weak epistemic egoism also contributes to
greater reliability in the attainment of true
beliefs by preventing the proliferation of
unscrupulous and spurious testimonies.
This means weak epistemic egoism does
not satisfy IV1 and IV2. A society could
benefit from the participation of more weak
epistemic egoists in truth-seeking, because
the criteria for accepting testimony will be
higher. The quality of testimony, in the
sense of justification and evidence, may
increase.
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To illustrate, suppose that two individuals
have different ways of approaching
informal news. Both Sofia and Caleb hear
from a classmate that their professor has
cancelled their evening class. Sofia does not
hesitate to accept the news and makes new
plans for the evening. Caleb is a bit wary,
since he knows that the classmate who gave
the news is not reliable. The classmate has
a record of pranking fellow classmates,
particularly on the matter of cancelled
classes. Caleb does not accept the testimony
and sticks to the idea that there will still be
a class that evening. He remembers, for
instance, that there was a scheduled
recitation that evening. The class meets that
evening, and Caleb was served well by his
weak epistemic egoism. The following
week, a more reliable classmate announces
to Caleb that the evening class is cancelled.
Caleb believes the trustworthy classmate
(and the class is indeed cancelled) and
forms a correct belief as a result. Weak
epistemic egoism, in these examples, can be
considered part of a reliable belief-forming
process. It negates weak premises and
prevents hasty judgment.
A possible rebuttal to the epistemic virtue
of weak epistemic egoism can be seen in
situations wherein we do not have good
reasons to believe a person, yet it makes
sense to believe them anyway. For instance,
I am visiting a new city and I need
directions to the nearest mall. I would ask a
passerby for directions and succeed in
getting to the mall as a result. Arguably, it
appears that I had no particular reason to

trust the passerby. I supposedly had no
way of determining if the person I asked on
the street was credible in giving directions.
We might intuitively think that the
passerby’s testimony or directions gave me
reason to form a true belief about how to
reach the nearest mall.
This example can be countered by asserting
that, in reality, we do not often randomly
pick out people to ask for directions. We
may not have the luxury of time to get
plenty of information about the people
around us, but we can make quick
assessments about the apparent knowledge
and credibility that they possess. For
instance, I am not going to ask directions
from a toddler on the street. Given a choice
between a random passerby and security
guard, I would be better served by asking
the latter. These are decisions we make
quickly, hence it may look like we do them
instinctively. This means that although it
may appear that we have no particular
reason to trust people we ask directions
from, we actually make rapid and
reasonable assessments about their
capacities.

4. Extreme Epistemic Egoism as an
Intellectual Vice
In this section I examine the failure of
extreme epistemic egoism to meet the
requirements of virtue. Consequently, I
will present the argument for extreme
epistemic egoism being an intellectual vice.
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Extreme epistemic egoism can produce
false beliefs (IV1). Not giving epistemic
authority to anyone is likely to cause
problems in the attainment of true beliefs.
In matters of significant expertise, for
instance, it would be more prudent for me
to defer to a more knowledgeable person
(ex. consulting a specialist for my medical
symptoms vs. self-diagnosis) instead of
trying to arrive at my own conclusion. Left
on my own, I could produce false beliefs in
such situations.

Unlike weak epistemic egoism, extreme
epistemic egoism is not a desire for higher
quality testimony but a blanket disregard
of others’ testimony. Higher quality
testimony or information may be gained,
but there is reason to doubt that this will
frequently be the case. The only testimony
that is relevant to the extreme epistemic
egoist is his own. In this sense extreme
epistemic egoism is analogous to ethical
egotism. The ethical egotist never feels
compassion for others, in the same way that
an extreme epistemic egoist never accepts
Even if extreme epistemic egoism does not
the testimony of others.
produce bad epistemic effects in some
cases, it can also fail to produce good It can be argued that the extreme epistemic
epistemic effects in others. For instance, if I egoist is more concerned about being right
stubbornly refuse help in trying to solve instead of getting things right. It does not
any problem, it can be argued that I am not matter what the claim is about. All that
exactly producing false beliefs, but my matters is that somebody else made the
attitude towards testimony prevents me claim, and this has, in the eyes of the
from producing good epistemic effects.
extreme epistemic egoist, made all the
difference in the search for truth.
Instead of being consistent with useful
epistemic doubt, extreme epistemic egoism The case for extreme epistemic egoism as
comes across as merely an immature and an attitude towards oneself and others as
grossly uncharitable reaction to the believers can be enhanced by discussing an
possibly valid views of others. Extreme opposing epistemic trait, such as openepistemic egoism can even be seen as a mindedness. Riggs (2010, 181) notes that
corruption of the rational principles of open-mindedness “is primarily an attitude
epistemic doubt. For instance, if epistemic towards oneself as a believer rather than
doubt compels us to not believe a claim toward any particular belief.” This means
unless there is adequate evidence for it, the that when someone asks me if I am openextreme epistemic egoist does not believe a minded, I am called upon to assess myself
claim despite adequate evidence for it. The as a believer, and not some specific belief.
extreme epistemic egoist also refuses to For argument’s sake, we can at least claim
believe a claim despite sufficient reasons that it can be an attitude towards a
for believing it.
particular belief when the belief in question
is about my abilities as a believer.
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Riggs (2010, 185) points out that “even a
generally open-minded person can be
closed-minded about some specific domain
in some specific situation,” and perhaps the
converse is true for extreme epistemic
egoism. We can say that even someone who
is generally an extreme epistemic egoist can
be open-minded in some specific domain or
situation. For instance, someone may be an
extreme epistemic egoist in general
conversations but grant fundamental or
derivative authority to her doctor
concerning health matters. In this light, if it
may be difficult to find a complete,
consistent,
dyed-in-the-wool
closedminded person, then it is just as difficult to
locate an individual who is a complete
extreme epistemic egoist. This is because
many, if not all, our social interactions
entail the granting of some form of
epistemic authority to others. Every time
we ask a question or make a request, we are
likely expected to grant epistemic authority
to others just so that the transaction can
proceed. To be a complete extreme
epistemic egoist is to be a particular kind of
skeptic: one believes only information that
was gained first-hand, and everything else
is rejected and seen as spurious.
Extreme epistemic egoism can lead to an
agent not being able to form true beliefs
about the past which he had no direct
experience of. An obvious example would
be the verification of historical facts,
wherein the extreme epistemic egoist has
no choice but to rely on the (reliable)
testimony of others. Because he decides

that no one but himself is qualified to sort
out the evidence, he believes no one.
However, because he believes no one
regarding historical facts, he ends up
believing only a handful of claims. He does
not believe any historical record apart from
history that he was able to experience
himself. Since he fails to arrive at any true
beliefs concerning historical facts apart
from the little that he experienced himself,
it is doubtful that he is truly motivated by a
desire for truth. If he had sufficiently
realized that believing testimony was the
optimal route towards true belief, then he
would have had no trouble with it,
especially in the case of historical facts. A
case in point would be a particularly
insidious form of Holocaust denialism.
Some Holocaust denialists assert that the
massacre of millions of Jews during World
War II never happened because, absurdly,
they do not know anyone who can confirm
the fact or there are fewer people today
who can attest that it actually happened.
The extreme epistemic egoist also fails to
form beliefs about claims wherein firsthand knowledge is nearly impossible.
Suppose the topic in question is incest.
Unless she has personal knowledge and
experience of the topic, the extreme
epistemic egoist will not form any relevant
beliefs concerning it. This is problematic,
since it possibly entails the repugnant
suggestion that he would, as Kafka once
put it, “flail himself on his unfortunate
sister” just to get the facts straight. This
means that she will likely not produce
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many true beliefs concerning incest or process. In other words, one does not need
remain confused and ignorant about it.
to possess certain beliefs to be an extreme
epistemic egoist. One can be an extreme
This leads to the point that an extreme
epistemic egoist even in the basic activity of
epistemic egoist is handicapped in the
forming beliefs.
pursuit of true beliefs. It means therefore
that extreme epistemic egoism fails the Shunning testimony and over-reliance on
criterion of reliabilism. A virtuous one’s ability to arrive at truth sometimes
epistemic agent, say a weak epistemic causes the extreme epistemic egoist to
egoist, is able to discern who can give produce false beliefs. The qualification is
reliable testimony, and this in turn can lead important, because it cannot be denied that
to a fairly reliable process of coming up the extreme epistemic egoist can still arrive
with true beliefs. An extreme epistemic at true beliefs in spite of himself. The crucial
egoist on the other hand does not care for point is that epistemic trust for other
any sort of testimony, and so there will be reliable agents is essential to producing
cases when forming true beliefs is some true beliefs.
problematic or even impossible.
For example, a man who has recently
become a father wants to form true beliefs
about childbirth in order to empathize
better with his wife. The commonsense
approach here would be to collect
testimony regarding childbirth from those
who have experienced and studied it.
However, since the extreme epistemic
egoist must see things for himself, he is
physically unable to form beliefs in the
manner that he deems fit. Despite being
aware of the absurdity of his requirement
for true belief, he holds on to the notion that
unless he has direct experience of
childbirth (whether of his own or that of
others), he will not form any beliefs about
it. Extreme epistemic egoism in this case is
not about shutting out beliefs that are
contrary to one’s own. Rather, it is about
being unable to form beliefs because of
one’s attitude towards the belief-forming

5. Extreme Epistemic Egoism as a
Virtue

Extreme epistemic egoists are not
necessarily individuals who simply live in
their own worlds or bubbles, shut off from
the rest of the epistemic community.
Although they are not interested in
corroborating with others their particular
views of the world, they are nonetheless
individuals situated within an epistemic
community. This can be seen, for instance,
when extreme epistemic egoists, for some
reason, flourish or perform relatively well
in some epistemic communities.
This leads us to be possibility that extreme
epistemic egoism does not always produce
bad epistemic effects. Arguably, extreme
epistemic egoism can also sometimes be a
virtue. In rare situations, an extreme
epistemic egoist fares better than other
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knowers. This can happen, for instance,
when the extreme epistemic egoist actually
holds a correct belief, and he holds the
belief strongly. Holding the true belief
strongly may be useful in dealing with
potentially
nuisance,
irrelevant,
or
malevolently motivated information. In
other words, if the extreme epistemic egoist
has knowledge, then his stance against
testimony would be to his advantage in
certain “anti-knowledge” situations.

argue that extreme epistemic egoism can be
virtuous. The gist of the argument is that it
is sometimes better, when one has
knowledge, to be resistant to the views of
others especially when such views are
consciously or unconsciously designed to
deceive. The possession of knowledge is
the important qualifier, since there can still
be some merit, arguably, to exposing
oneself to various views when one does not
have knowledge yet. However, since we
consider knowledge to be an epistemic
Consider someone who has been taken
good, then we can do what is needed in
captive by a brainwashed cult. Assuming
order to preserve it.
that the members of the cult are
brainwashed to believe falsehoods (such as A counterpoint to all this, however, is that
that their lives may be saved at the end of the benefits one gains from assuming the
the world if they would follow their extreme epistemic egoist’s position in
leader’s every whim), they will also ensure knowledge-hostile environments have
that the prisoner turns into one of their own little to do with knowledge itself, and more
and believes the same things as they do. to do with other kinds of goods. For
The prisoner then would be best served by instance, it could be the case that one is
sticking to his beliefs dogmatically in the being an extreme epistemic egoist to
face of such malevolent attacks on his preserve a particular belief for pragmatic
epistemic agency. Assuming that one has reasons. The self-deception employed by
knowledge, some form of intellectual an extreme epistemic egoist can be seen in
arrogance or self-deception is necessary to the endurance athlete who tells herself not
thwart the advances of genuine, to listen to what other people say about her
malevolently motivated deception.
chances of finishing the ultra-marathon
(even well-meaning advice coming from
This example points to the idea that
doctors and other athletes) and just focus
problematic epistemic environments (or
on her own belief that she can make it. The
even Gettier-like situations) open the
athlete barely makes it to the end of the
possibility of extreme epistemic egoism
race, but what was crucial in this situation
being a virtue. Battaly raised a similar idea
is not specifically that her belief about
in the value of closed-mindedness in an
finishing the race is true. What matters is
‘epistemically
hostile’
environment
that she actually managed to finish the race,
(2018b). The basis for this is that in certain
bizarre epistemic environments we can
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two specific claims: (1) weak epistemic
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vice. The discussion drew from the
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result of that discussion was the notion that
extreme epistemic egoism can be valuable,
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